PAXIS ALPHA RESEARCH · Deep Industry Research June 22, 2026
中文 · English

Where Does the Next $100 Billion of AI Capex Actually Go?

We strip a real AI megafactory down to 18 layers, 292 line-item components and roughly 900 listed companies — mapping, layer by layer, whose pocket each dollar lands in, which handful of chokepoints genuinely throttles the chain, and why "how important a company is" and "whether it is worth owning today" are so often two entirely different questions.
Industry Deep Dive · AI Datacenter Full-Stack Map
Editorial illustration: a layered cross-section of the AI datacenter supply chain — power, silicon, memory, networking and upstream materials stacking up into a compute megafactory
Industry Deep Dive · AI Datacenter Full-Stack Map 18 Layers · 292 Components · ~900 Listed Companies
18
Industry Layers
From land to AI safety
292
Line-item Components
Broken out one by one
~900
Listed Companies
Investable names worldwide
9
Independent Chokepoints
The real capacity bottlenecks
Contents
Introduction · "Stargate" on a Texas Scrubland ▼

The market stares at NVIDIA and the handful of most expensive chips, and buys the entire AI datacenter as a single story. But the next hundred billion dollars has to travel through 18 layers, close to 300 distinct components and some 900 companies before it actually touches the ground. Most people see only the most conspicuous layer, and miss where the chain is genuinely throttled: power that cannot be connected, advanced packaging you cannot get a slot for, high-bandwidth memory controlled by three suppliers — and one layer of base material with effectively a single credible source. More important still: how much a company matters within the chain, and whether it is worth owning today, are frequently two different questions. This report takes the entire chain apart layer by layer; our own judgment follows below.

Take a real AI megafactory apart, and look at whose pocket each dollar lands in — and why "booking revenue" and "earning profit" are two completely different things.

$3.4B → $15B: roughly $3.4bn raised in the first phase; the full campus (1.2GW, eight buildings) has been publicly framed at a scale of about $15bn.

Outside Abilene, Texas, there is a stretch of scrubland where, not long ago, there was nothing at all.

Today an AI campus called Stargate stands on it. No single company built it; several parties each own a segment. Lancium supplies the land, and holds an already-approved grid interconnection permit (the right to hook into the main grid — a queue that is itself very long). Crusoe, a private company, together with capital partners including Blue Owl, finances, builds and operates the facility. Oracle (ORCL) procures and operates the compute systems inside it, supplying that compute to OpenAI. OpenAI is the anchor customer consuming it. Power runs on two legs: a connection to the main grid, plus on-site generation. The point of self-generation is not to leave the grid behind, but to get electrons sooner and more reliably.

The buildings are packed with NVIDIA (NVDA) GB200 NVL72 racks — Blackwell-generation AI racks. Each rack draws so much power that conventional air conditioning simply cannot hold the line; liquid has to touch the silicon directly, or the chips throttle quickly and can trip into shutdown.

How big are the numbers? Disclosed first-phase financing is roughly $3.4bn. Once expanded to 1.2GW (gigawatts — a gigawatt is roughly the output of one large power station) across eight buildings, the full campus has been described as a partnership commitment of about $15bn. The distinction matters: phase one is billions; the campus is tens of billions. And several dozen campuses of this kind are under construction simultaneously, in the US and worldwide.

Which raises the question: these billions, these tens of billions — and, across the next few years, plausibly trillions in aggregate — where do they actually flow? Who gets paid first, who gets paid most, and who merely looks adjacent to the boom while earning nothing from it?

This article recommends no stock and sets no price target. It does something rarely attempted instead: it takes the entire AI datacenter chain — 18 layers, 292 components, roughly 900 listed companies — apart piece by piece and explains each one. As far as we know there is no comparably complete map of the AI compute supply chain in Chinese-language research (the full table sits in the appendix at the end; skip to it whenever you want to look something up). Once you have it, you can open any AI headline and immediately judge whether the company in question truly sits on the main artery of the money flow, or merely stands beside it catching reflected light.

120kW
Peak load per rack
Equivalent to 40 household air conditioners running at once — air cooling cannot hold it
3 years
Transformer lead time
Large power transformers take over three years to deliver; money does not buy speed here
5–10 years
US grid interconnection wait
Median wait from interconnection application to energization exceeds five years
50%+
ABF film concentration
The critical film in AI chip packaging — more than half supplied by Ajinomoto, a Japanese seasonings company
Analyst Blind Spot · 01

The nine "independent chokepoints" share a common roster of companies and one common material — diversifying across them is double-counting the same bet

On the surface, transformers/power distribution, cooling fluids and datacenter siting look like three separate supply-chain bottlenecks. Dig in, and GE Vernova, Hitachi Energy and Siemens Energy appear simultaneously in the representative-company lists for Bottleneck 2 (high-voltage transformers) and Bottleneck 3 (power system integration). Which means:

Conclusion: when building AI infrastructure exposure, examine the underlying-company overlap across different "chokepoint themes" before sizing positions — rather than treating "9 chokepoints" as shorthand for "9 uncorrelated names to buy."

Analyst Blind Spot · 02

The "capacity relief" date sell-side notes take comfort in is precisely the trigger for their own short thesis

Numerous Wall Street notes frame the easing of CoWoS advanced packaging capacity (expected 2H 2026) and the loosening of HBM memory supply (expected post-2026) as good news for falling AI compute costs. But that same date fires two shocks in the opposite direction:

Conclusion: when a research note characterises a supply bottleneck's "relief date" as an unambiguously positive signal, the question to press is: which parts of the chain does that relief hurt? When a supply constraint disappears, the companies whose premium depended on it lose pricing power at the same moment.

I. From One Question to One Word: the Whole Chain Behind a Single AI Machine

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You ask an AI on your phone: "Draft me an email requesting time off."

Three seconds later, the email appears. What happened in the physical world during those three seconds?

Your sentence first travels down fibre into some datacenter. There, one chip — or dozens — begins performing an astronomical volume of arithmetic. That is what AI fundamentally is: breaking every word you type into numbers, then using vast quantities of multiplication and addition to "guess" what the next word most likely is. This is inference: using a trained model to answer questions. Its counterpart is training: the months spent "teaching" the model in the first place.

To guess a single word, the chip must repeatedly pull the model's parameters out of the high-bandwidth memory (HBM — memory stacked directly against the chip, with extremely fast read/write) beside it. Dozens of chips then have to be lashed together by an extremely fast network into a single unit, like a class of students solving one large problem together, with nobody allowed to fall behind. All of this silicon generates heat as it computes — enough heat that liquid has to touch it to cool it down. And the precondition for all of it is that the building has sufficient, stable, cheap electricity.

So in order for that one word to appear, not a single link in the chain can be missing:

Power → silicon → memory → networking → cooling → software. Break any link and the email never arrives.

You very likely already own a slice of this build-out indirectly. The largest weights in the S&P 500 index fund you hold are precisely participants in this chain. Your retirement account and your index contributions have already put money into that scrubland outside Abilene. You have simply never taken it apart to look: there are eighteen links in this chain, each with its own roster of publicly listed companies — and what they earn, how they earn it, and how hard the earning is differ enormously.

What follows assembles those eighteen links into a factory map you can hold in your head.

Six links, none optional: what happens in the physical world every time you ask an AI something

⚡ Power Grid & Generation ~15–20% opex
Largest recurring datacenter cost
→
🖥️ Silicon GPU / NPU ~30–40% capex
Largest single capital line item
→
💾 Memory HBM / DRAM ~10–15% capex
Where the bandwidth ceiling sits
→
🔗 Networking InfiniBand / RoCE ~5–8% capex
Source of cluster interconnect latency
→
❄️ Cooling Liquid / Air ~5–10% capex+opex
Liquid cooling demand rising fast
→
⚙️ Software CUDA / Kernels ~2–5% ongoing
Highest multiplier effect

Break any link and the email never arrives. ⚡ Power and silicon are flagged as today's global supply-chain bottlenecks.

II. The Panorama: Splitting the Factory into Eighteen Layers (Reader's Guide)

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This section does one thing: hand you a map of the whole. We split the AI datacenter, from “who writes the cheque” to “who works the night shift”, into eighteen layers, and for each cover only three things: what it does, how easy money is to make there (a stable annuity, a cyclical business at the mercy of the market, or a chokepoint where a handful of firms set the terms), and whether it warrants your deeper attention. The specific components and companies beneath each layer are compiled in the companion table, 18 Layers · 292 Components. That table is the real substance of this report — 18 layers, 292 components, roughly 900 listed companies, with very broad coverage, there for you to navigate by. This section walks the skeleton first; turn to the full map when you need the detail.

How to read this map. The eighteen layers are not flat. The great majority are “earn volume as AI scales” businesses: there is more work to go around, but anyone can do it and no excess profit accrues. The layers that are genuinely scarce, that genuinely hold pricing power, are concentrated in a handful. Work through this map and you will understand why Section VI digs into the particular bottlenecks it does, rather than any others.
Annuity Cyclical Hybrid Chokepoint ★ Click any layer to expand its description
L1 💰 Layer 1 · Demand and the People Writing the Cheques Annuity ›
This is the source of the entire chain: the people who decide how much to spend on compute. It sits at the very top, and only once it moves do the seventeen layers below it have work to do. What matters here is not whether these companies themselves make money from AI — hyperscalers (hyperscale cloud providers) earn their money from advertising, e-commerce and cloud, and AI is an enormous expense line for them, not a revenue line. What matters is one question: whether this demand is real and durable, or a circular loop propped up by vendors financing purchases of their own products. The representative names are a handful of hyperscalers and frontier model labs. This layer is the report's standing question mark over whether demand is genuine; Section VII takes it apart in detail.
L2 🏢 Layer 2 · Cloud Operators, Colocation and Financing Annuity ›
The people who actually operate the compute, plus the people funding the buildings behind them. Most of it is an annuity-style tollbooth business (annuity = a stable, recurring revenue stream; tollbooth = anyone who wants to pass through has to pay). Once a facility is built, long-term leases collect rent year after year, and leaders with prime locations and scarce power hold real pricing power. There is one exception inside the layer: neoclouds — new companies whose business is renting out GPUs — expand a heavy asset base on borrowed money, which makes them closer to a leveraged cyclical bet: high torque when conditions are good, heavy pressure when they turn. Representative names include datacenter REITs (real-estate investment trusts) and interconnection hub operators.
L3 🏗️ Layer 3 · Development, Construction and Commissioning Cyclical ›
The people who turn empty land into a building you can switch on: siting, design, construction, commissioning. Most of it is engineering contracting and building-materials supply — modest gross margins, rising and falling with the construction cycle, a textbook cyclical commodity business. The compensation is that the AI build-out has pushed backlog (work contracted but not yet delivered) out several years, giving unusually long visibility. A few steps — critical commissioning, fire certification — carry some barriers, but the layer as a whole has little pricing power.
L4 ⚡ Layer 4 · Generation and the Grid Hybrid · Chokepoint ★ ›
Where electricity originates: regulated utilities, on-site gas-fired generation at the campus, nuclear, fuel cells, wind, solar and storage, plus the transmission network and large substations that carry high-voltage power over long distances. Two different businesses are blended here: regulated utilities (annuity-like rent collection — stable returns that never spike) and cyclical equipment manufacturing (gas turbines, transformers, with orders riding the capex wave). This is the report's first genuinely hard chokepoint: large power transformers queue more than three years out, heavy-duty gas turbine capacity is sold through 2028, and a handful of oligopolists hold the pricing power. Section VI digs into this as bottleneck number one.
L5 🔌 Layer 5 · Power Distribution and Conversion Hybrid · Chokepoint ★ ›
Once power is through the campus gate, it has to step down from hundreds of thousands of volts to a few volts, stage by stage, and land cleanly on a chip worth tens of thousands of dollars. This layer is that step-down distribution chain inside the fence: transformers, switchgear, uninterruptible power supplies (UPS — the backup that takes over the instant utility power drops), power distribution units, rack power. There is a split here that nobody articulates clearly: facility-scale hardware (transformers, complete UPS systems) is a fat-margin business held by five global oligopolists and walled off by certification; the closer you move to the rack, the more the layer is dominated by Taiwanese power-supply ODMs on thin margins competing purely on cost. If you like “power equipment”, first establish which end of it you are buying.
L6 ❄️ Layer 6 · Cooling, Thermal Management and Water Hybrid · Chokepoint ★ ›
Power goes into the chip, and the moment the chip starts working it throws off startling amounts of heat — a fully loaded AI rack is far beyond anything conventional air conditioning can hold. This layer is the complete equipment set that moves heat away from the die, out of the hall, and ultimately off the campus. It is the twin bottleneck bound to power supply: if electricity gets in but heat cannot get out, the machines still will not run. Economically, three businesses stack here: the complete liquid-cooling loop is a fat-margin tollbooth; the cold plates and fans that touch the silicon are thin-margin Taiwanese contract manufacturing; and coolant and water are an invisible annuity consumable. Gatekeeping components such as coolant distribution units (CDUs) carry high certification barriers and are the highest-quality slice of the layer. Section VI discusses the industrial cadence of liquid cooling.
L7 🖥️ Layer 7 · Compute Silicon / Accelerators Extreme Chokepoint ★★ ›
The heart of the whole factory: chips purpose-built for the vast multiply-and-add workload AI demands — accelerators, in industry language. This is the highest-ASP, fattest-margin and most closely watched layer in the chain. Its economics are extreme: a very small number of companies, NVIDIA above all, capture most of the industry's profit, with pricing power that borders on absurd. At the same time, challengers of every description and several national programmes are fighting to get in, which makes it simultaneously the most reliable gold mine and the most ferociously contested battlefield. Beyond merchant GPUs there are hyperscaler in-house silicon programmes (the route around NVIDIA, which shifts value from “the company selling the chip” to “the company helping you design it”) and inference-specific chips. NVDA is the representative name; AVGO and MRVL sit on the design-services line.
L8 ⚙️ Layer 8 · Logic, CPUs, Analog and Power Management ICs Cyclical ›
The large supporting cast of chips surrounding the accelerator: the host CPU directing traffic, the power ICs managing delivery, the management and sensor chips handling logistics. Lower unit price than an accelerator and far less glamorous, but take any of them away and the accelerator cannot do its job. The layer is extremely fragmented with an enormous company count (analog alone is an ocean), mixing niches where a few names take nearly everything — server CPUs, for instance — with red oceans of hundreds of competitors. Within it, wide-bandgap power devices (GaN/SiC, higher-efficiency materials revived by AI's high-voltage power delivery) are one of the few genuinely differentiated high-growth directions.
L8B 🔩 Layer 8B · Passives, Electromechanical and Board-level Components Cyclical ›
Everything on the board that is not a chip: the mass of components costing a few cents apiece — capacitors, resistors, inductors, connectors. Outsiders never look twice, but a single AI server consumes thousands of them and the aggregate bill is substantial; and the more monstrous chip power becomes, the more demanding the specifications on these small parts. The layer is extremely fragmented with very low unit prices, and is won on scale, yield and getting onto NVIDIA's approved bill of materials. Within it, high-speed connectors have been lifted from commodity part to premium gatekeeping position by AI's speed and density requirements.
L9 💾 Layer 9 · Memory and Storage Chokepoint ★★ ›
The chip does the computing, but the data has to sit somewhere while it does — this layer is the AI factory's memory. Memory is the workbench (fast, wiped the moment power is cut); storage is the warehouse (slow, but retains data without power). The memory business has always behaved like a cyclical, with prices swinging violently on supply and demand. But its highest tier — HBM (high-bandwidth memory, mounted beside the AI chip and, per unit, worth more than the chip itself) — is evolving from pure cyclical into chokepoint, because a certification wall keeps challengers out. Only three suppliers worldwide can make it, which makes it the hardest-pricing-power tollbooth in AI memory. Section VI treats HBM as a headline bottleneck.
L10 🌐 Layer 10 · Networking and Electrical Interconnect Hybrid ›
An AI factory is not one chip working alone but thousands working as a team on the same problem, and this layer connects them electrically into a single whole: switches, network interface cards, and every flavour of copper cable and connector. It is sharply polarised. Upstream, switch silicon is a high-margin, wide-moat business belonging to Broadcom and a few others. Downstream, copper cabling and connectors are a thin-margin, cost-driven business crowded with Taiwanese and mainland Chinese contract manufacturers. NVIDIA's NVLink — the in-rack vertical interconnect that converts “selling chips” into “locking in an ecosystem” — is one of its deepest moats. Representative names are AVGO (switch silicon), CSCO and ANET.
L11 🔆 Layer 11 · Optics and Photonics Cyclical Growth ›
Over any distance, electrical signalling attenuates and burns power, so the signal is converted into light, carried over fibre, and converted back at the far end. This layer is the sum of that electrical-optical conversion plus everything the light passes through on the way, with optical modules — the electrical-to-optical translators — as the core product. The larger the AI cluster and the more chip-to-chip communication it requires, the more optical modules it consumes: an inconspicuous but very large cost. The layer has a clean product upgrade cycle (400G to 800G to 1.6T, where G denotes line rate), and the next generation, co-packaged optics (CPO), is a high-payoff directional chokepoint. Section VI discusses the mismatch between supply and profit along the optical line. Representative names are the leading Chinese and US optical module makers plus COHR.
L12 🗄️ Layer 12 · Servers, Racks and System Integration Cyclical ›
Everything above produces parts, and parts are not a working machine. This layer is final assembly: chips, memory, NICs, cold plates and power supplies all go into the rack, get tested and burned in, and the complete rack ships to the hall ready to energise. The overwhelming majority are Taiwanese and mainland ODMs running a thin-margin cyclical business competing on scale, lead time and yield, with no pricing power. But a few stations on the line have been revalued by AI: rack-scale integration, GPU compute trays and liquid-cooling leak testing are the handful of steps with genuine tollbooth characteristics. Representative names are several Taiwanese ODMs and SMCI.
L13 🏭 Layer 13 · Semiconductor Manufacturing Chokepoint ★ ›
Companies such as NVIDIA and Broadcom draw the blueprints and fabricate not a single chip themselves (the industry term is fabless); the blueprints go to whoever owns the factories, and this layer is those factories. They do three things: turn silicon into transistors (wafer fabrication), dice and package the die (assembly and test), and — increasingly decisive in the AI era — advanced packaging, fitting several chips into one package like building blocks so they work as a unit. The layer is extraordinarily capital-intensive (a leading-edge fab routinely runs to tens of billions of dollars), highly concentrated among oligopolists, and the most geopolitically sensitive of all. Advanced packaging — CoWoS, for example — is the true gate on AI chip shipments, tighter than wafer capacity itself; Section VI takes it apart. TSM is the representative name.
L14 🔬 Layer 14 · Semiconductor Equipment, Metrology and Test Chokepoint ★★ ›
The factories in the layer above are formidable because they can both afford and skilfully operate the machines this layer sells. Equipment can account for more than 70% of the total investment in a leading-edge fab. The economics of this layer (WFE, wafer fab equipment, in industry shorthand) are exceptionally clear-cut: nearly every machine category is a one-to-three-supplier oligopoly; the technical barrier is high enough that decades can pass without a new entrant; the more advanced the node, the fewer the qualified suppliers and the harder the pricing power; and a machine sold once collects service revenue every year thereafter. Lithography is the extreme case: ASML alone controls the master valve on the world's most advanced process nodes. Representative names are ASML, AMAT, KLA and Advantest.
L15 🧪 Layer 15 · Semiconductor Materials, Substrates and Chemicals Chokepoint ★★ ›
Take the factory upstream as far as it will go, and you reach the raw materials and consumables used to make chips: ultra-pure silicon wafers, photoresists that develop under light, electronic specialty gases purified beyond reason, and the packaging materials that frame and lid the die. Most are consumables — every wafer produced burns another batch. Three characteristics are worth fixing in mind. First, this is the layer with the heaviest Japanese concentration in the entire chain and the least press coverage: for many critical materials, only one or two Japanese companies in the world can make them. Second, the formulations represent decades of accumulated know-how and cannot simply be copied, which makes the moats extremely deep. Third, single-point risk is high — ABF film for advanced packaging, where Ajinomoto alone accounts for the overwhelming majority of supply, is the canonical example. Section VI uses this kind of single point that money alone cannot open as its case study.
L16 📐 Layer 16 · EDA, Design IP and Design Services Annuity ›
The most upstream intellectual work in the chain. An AI chip contains tens of billions of transistors (the smallest switches in a circuit), far beyond what a human hand can draw, so it has to be designed, simulated and verified with dedicated software: EDA, electronic design automation. Beyond tools, the layer sells two further things: design IP (pre-built, pre-verified circuit blocks licensed and dropped straight into your own chip) and design services (if you have the idea but no team, you outsource the entire chip). The economics are excellent: global EDA tools are effectively divided among three giants in a high-margin, high-stickiness licensing business. In processor IP, Arm is the asset-light annuity archetype, collecting royalties on chip shipments. Representative names are SNPS, CDNS and ARM.
L17 🧠 Layer 17 · AI Infrastructure Software, Scheduling and DCIM Open-source Led ›
The machines are installed, but thousands of GPUs will not coordinate themselves — a full software stack has to direct traffic, allocate jobs and monitor continuously. This is the datacenter's software brain. One feature of this layer is worth remembering: a large share of it is open-source software (public software anyone can use for free) or hyperscalers' internal tooling that is never sold externally, so many sub-segments contain very few pure listed companies you can actually buy. What is investable falls into a few buckets: observability and monitoring software (high-margin subscription, one of the best investment exposures in the layer), data platforms, and datacenter infrastructure management software (DCIM). NVIDIA's CUDA — the bedrock of this entire software ecosystem — is the substance of its most inescapable moat.
L18 🛡️ Layer 18 · Cybersecurity, Resilience and Operations Annuity ›
The machines are running, and three things still have to be prevented: hackers stealing data, systems going down, and anyone physically entering the hall to cause damage — all while sustaining uptime through the year. This layer is the datacenter's security guard, fire brigade and on-call operations team. Its economics are very good: cybersecurity is almost entirely an annual subscription software business with high renewal rates and gross margins typically between 70% and 80%, making it one of the steadiest annuity cash flows in the chain. Listed-company density is high and there are many pure-play names you can buy directly, which makes it the most accessible layer for an ordinary investor.

III. Where the Money Goes: Two Waterfalls

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When people hear that “an AI datacenter costs ten billion dollars”, the number is usually a blur. The first thing to do is pin down what that ten billion actually refers to.

To make the arithmetic legible, assume this phase of the Abilene campus costs exactly $10 billion ($10B) in total one-off investment to build. That is a round number chosen for ease of calculation, not Abilene's actual figure. The $10bn covers two things: the civil works of putting up the buildings, plus every piece of IT equipment loaded into them (silicon, servers, networking). This is the money it takes to go from nothing to powered-on, and the industry calls it build capex — the one-time outlay to build the plant and buy the equipment. It excludes the electricity bills, software fees and other recurring costs paid year after year once the campus is live. These two kinds of money behave completely differently, so we take them one table at a time.

Waterfall One: the One-off Cost of Getting Built

The $10bn falls like a waterfall, poured in at the top and cascading down layer by layer. The shares below are indicative ranges at industry-typical magnitudes, not Abilene's precise accounts. One widely cited breakdown — drawing on McKinsey's estimates for AI infrastructure in 2030 and Epoch AI's modelling of a 1GW plant — runs roughly as follows:

Where the $10bn Broadly Goes Order of Magnitude Representative Recipients Margin Quality
Technology and compute equipment (silicon, servers, networking) ~60% NVIDIA NVDA, Broadcom AVGO, Marvell MRVL Extremely variable (see below)
Power, cooling and electrical (generation, transformation, UPS, liquid cooling) ~25% Eaton ETN, Vertiv VRT, GE Vernova GEV Above average, and improving
Land, civil works and site development (siting, construction) ~15% EMCOR EME, Sterling STRL, Quanta PWR Low to mid, but with long order visibility

One distinction to keep straight: this is a breakdown of total investment, in which compute equipment takes the lion's share. If you look only at the construction portion — excluding the silicon itself — power, electrical and cooling account for a far larger share than the table suggests, because the deeper into physical infrastructure you go, the more absolutely dominant power and heat rejection become.

Waterfall Two: What Gets Paid Every Year After Energisation

Once the campus is running, the following payments go out month after month and year after year, and cannot stop while the plant is alive: electricity (to the generation operators), software and security subscriptions (names such as PLTR Palantir, CrowdStrike and Datadog, where software gross margins typically run 70%–80%), and equipment maintenance and spare-parts service (the aftermarket business of equipment vendors such as Vertiv and Caterpillar).

Separating the two waterfalls is what lets you see something most people run together: some companies earn the one-off lump from building the plant, while others earn the long, steady stream that flows for as long as the plant is alive. The latter are the ones we describe further on as able to charge twice.

Revenue Pool ≠ Profit Pool

Return now to the first waterfall, and to that last column on margin. It contains the single most important lesson in this article:

Revenue pool ≠ profit pool. The volume of money a company handles tells you nothing about the money it keeps.

Server assembly is the textbook case. Companies such as Dell (DELL) and Supermicro (SMCI) book frighteningly large revenue: an AI server stuffed with NVIDIA silicon sells for several hundred thousand dollars, and the top line swells accordingly. But what they actually do is put someone else's expensive chips into a metal box. On the AI server assembly step alone, gross margin can be as thin as roughly 5%; even Supermicro's company-level gross margin has recently run in the single digits to 10% range (specifically, about 9.9% in its most recent fiscal quarter). Of every $100 of revenue passing across their books, very little stays. (In fairness, Dell's overall gross margin is considerably higher, because it also sells storage and services rather than only assembling AI servers.) The money flows through their hands; it does not all land in their pockets.

Now look at NVIDIA. Company-level gross margin ran around 71% in its most recent fiscal year, and closer to 75% in the latest quarter: on the same $100 passing through, it keeps more than seventy. Why? Because it occupies a position nobody can route around. Its chips come with a software ecosystem called CUDA, on which AI programmers worldwide write their code; switching to another vendor's silicon means relearning the craft. That quality of being unavoidable is what investors call a moat. The deeper the moat, the stronger the pricing power, and the fatter the gross margin.

The Three Determinants of Bargaining Power

Why does the same category — hardware — pay single digits for assembly and seventy percent for NVIDIA? Not because silicon is inherently nobler than assembly, but because of a rule you can actually measure: bargaining power depends on three things — how hard you are to replace, how concentrated your suppliers are, and how concentrated your customers are.

Think of the salt seller and the vegetable seller in a market. The difference is not that salt outranks greens: that particular salt has a single source, switching suppliers means waiting six months, and salt buyers are numerous and fragmented — so the salt seller sets the terms. Vegetables are everywhere, three stalls are indistinguishable, and the biggest buyer is a canteen that negotiates hard — so the vegetable seller has no say. How much each layer of the AI chain earns comes down to the same question every time: can the customer manage without you?

Two Waterfalls: How the Money Flows and Who Retains the Most

← Left: build phase (one-off capital)  |  Right: operating phase (recurring revenue) →

Build Waterfall / One-off Capital Expenditure
Hyperscaler Capex Source of funds — AWS / Azure / Google / Meta
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Land & Power Rights Government & developers — permits & grid interconnection Access cost
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Civil Construction General contractors — high volume, thin margin Commodity profit
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Power Equipment ⚡ Transformers · UPS · generators Chokepoint capture — Eaton / Schneider / ABB
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Cooling Infrastructure Liquid-cooling units · chillers · thermal modules Higher bargaining power
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GPU / Compute Systems 🖥 Core compute hardware Largest chokepoint — NVIDIA dominance
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Memory / Networking / Storage HBM · InfiniBand · NVMe Oligopoly capture — SK hynix / Samsung / Micron
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System Integration & Commissioning Rack assembly · cabling · acceptance testing Thin-margin services
Operating Waterfall / Recurring Revenue Redistribution
End-user API Spend Enterprises / developers — billed per token
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Cloud Platform / GPU Rental Revenue Hyperscalers take the platform premium
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Inference Compute Power Draw Running 24/7 — electricity is the single largest opex block
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Utility ⚡ Annuity Grid operators — no technology required, paid regardless Chokepoint capture — annuity characteristics
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Cooling O&M & Coolant Replenishment Continuous thermal-system consumption — coolant / consumables Cyclical repurchase
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Software Subscriptions & Security SaaS OS licences · monitoring · security compliance High margin — recurring repurchase
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Depreciation & Debt Service GPUs amortised over 36–48 months + financing interest
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Operator Residual Profit Net profit after upstream capture — and compressing Competition intensifying

Colour depth = share of capital retained at that layer  ·  deep red / deep green = critical chokepoint  ·  light = commodity layer (high volume, thin margin)

Keep that yardstick in mind; it applies to every company that follows.

IV. Who Gets Paid First, and Who Gets Paid Twice

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Once you can see who earns the most, one further dimension matters just as much and is almost never discussed: timing. (A note: this section follows the money chronologically, in the order it leaves the account. The table in the previous section cut the same total along accounting categories. They are two different slices of one number.) The $10bn does not go out the door on a single day. Getting from scrubland to humming machines takes a year or two, sometimes longer, and the cash flows out in tranches, in sequence.

Walk Abilene through from nothing:

Tranche one goes to engineering design, land acquisition, and deposits on long-lead-time heavy equipment. Power transformers, for example, now take a year or two to arrive once ordered, so they have to be booked early with a deposit paid up front. That is why the order backlog of power equipment vendors (Eaton, Vertiv) — contracts signed but not yet delivered — is often already substantial before the plant is more than a drawing. They are the first in the chain to hear the money coming.

Tranche two goes to construction, electrical and cooling. Ground is broken, and the builders, the crews installing transformers and switchgear, and the teams running liquid-cooling pipework begin recognising revenue contract by contract. This is the densest stretch of the money flow.

Tranche three goes to compute and networking. Only once the buildings are up and power is live do NVIDIA's racks arrive in volume, and only then does spending on silicon, memory and networking get recognised at scale. (Operators chasing chip allocation may place orders far earlier to hold their place in the queue, so the sequence is not absolute.)

Tranche four goes to power, software, security and operations — the most attractive category of all, because it is paid month after month and year after year from the moment the campus energises, and cannot stop while the plant is alive. The market is willing to assign this kind of annuity business a steadier valuation.

And there is a fifth kind of money: getting paid a second time. Companies selling transformers or cooling systems earn once on the equipment sale; once that equipment is installed, years of maintenance, spare parts and service contracts are the second payment. It is the difference between buying an air conditioner once and then spending a decade on filters, compressor repairs and annual servicing. For a company like Vertiv (VRT), the aftermarket is often steadier and more profitable than selling new units. Companies that get paid twice have a structurally better business.

Lay those five payments along a timeline and you have a yardstick: when a new campus is announced, the first thing to show up in reported results is engineering and power equipment orders; then construction, electrical and cooling revenue; then silicon and networking; and only last the slow, steady stream of power, software and operations. This yardstick tells you whose numbers lead the cycle and whose lag it.

V. Four Clocks: Whichever Runs Slowest Holds the Pricing Power

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Editorial illustration: four gears turning at different speeds stand for the four clocks — the largest red gear, the power clock, drags on the entire chain

Money flows in sequence because four clocks inside this factory run at different speeds. First, correct an error many people make: “chips iterate quickly” and “chip capacity expands quickly” are two entirely different things. A new chip generation may arrive annually (product iteration), but getting fabs to actually turn out an additional batch of usable chips (capacity expansion) takes several years. The table below measures how long it takes to create incremental capacity, not how often the product refreshes.

ClockWhat It GovernsHow Fast It RunsWho Sits in the Way
Power / interconnection clock How long it takes to get a campus energised Typically 3 to 7+ years, varying widely by location Generation, transformers, switchgear, grid interconnection
Chip supply clock How long it takes to add a batch of usable chip capacity Roughly 1 to 3+ years Foundry, advanced packaging, HBM memory
System deployment clock How long to build chips into racks and wire racks into clusters Quarters to 1–2 years Server assembly, networking, optical modules
Utilisation clock How quickly it fills up and starts earning once built Weeks to years Software, operations, and inference demand itself

Of these four clocks, across many of today's large US greenfield projects — built from scratch on empty land — the power clock is usually the slowest. To energise a campus you must file for interconnection, wait in the utility's queue, and build transformers (which themselves queue for a year or two). Every step is counted in years. Which explains why Abilene generates its own power: waiting on the municipal grid was not an option.

That said, “power is slowest” is not an iron law. If a project uses behind-the-meter generation (power produced and consumed inside the campus), has already locked in its interconnection permit, or is a retrofit of an existing building, the slowest link may be something else entirely. Change the setting and the order changes.

What does the slowest clock mean? It means pricing power. When everyone wants to build an AI plant, when electricity simply is not there and transformers simply have to be waited for, the companies that can supply power, build transformers or shorten the path to energisation hold temporary scarcity. They do not have to discount to win orders; customers queue for their product. This is the rule that runs through the entire report: in a system where everyone is sprinting and one link is the binding constraint, that link temporarily takes the largest share of the bargaining power. Which raises the next question: which link is binding hardest right now — and will it stay that way?

Four Clocks: Whichever Runs Slowest Holds the Pricing Power

Slowest ★
⚡ Power / Interconnection Clock
How long it takes to energise a campus
SpeedVery slow
3–7 yrs+
Chokepoint: Generation, transformers, switchgear, grid interconnection
🖥 Chip Supply Clock
How long it takes to add usable chip capacity
SpeedSlow
1–3 yrs+
Chokepoint: Foundry, advanced packaging, HBM memory
🔧 System Deployment Clock
How long to build chips into racks and wire them into clusters
SpeedModerate
Quarters–1~2 yrs
Chokepoint: Server assembly, networking, optical modules
📊 Utilisation Clock
How fast it fills up and starts earning once built
SpeedFast (variable)
Weeks–years
Chokepoint: Software, operations, inference demand itself
Slowest today → The power clock (3–7 yrs+) → Holds the pricing power Especially pronounced on greenfield projects

6. Where the Bottlenecks Are, Where They Move Next, and the “Shelf Life” of a Shortage

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This is the chapter to read slowly.

Start with where the binding constraint sits today. For many already-announced campuses, the tightest link has shifted from “are there enough chips” to “can we actually get power connected.” That is not to say chips are freely available — high-bandwidth memory and advanced packaging remain tight. It is to say that for projects where the silicon is ordered and the building can be put up, and the only missing piece is energisation, power and electrical equipment have become the hardest narrow point.

But there is a place where the market habitually pitches its focus one level too high, and it repays digging down layer by layer.

Below we take the most critical bottlenecks one at a time and work each to the bottom. Every one answers the same four questions: what it actually is, why it binds, how long it can bind, and what would break it. This section runs long, but it is the part of this report that is genuinely worth something.

Bottleneck 1: Power Simply Cannot Be Connected — the Shortage Is Not Generation, It Is the Queue

First, correct a common misconception. What the United States lacks is not only generation; it is the whole capability set required to plug a campus into the grid. Several constraints stack here at once: is there enough generation, enough transmission line, will the substation equipment arrive, and can the interconnection approval even get scheduled. A several-hundred-megawatt AI campus that wants power must first file an interconnection request with the utility, then queue, then go through grid impact studies, then build the associated substation and lines.

How long is that queue? Take the Texas grid (ERCOT, the body that manages the Texas power system): large-load interconnection requests waiting in the queue total roughly 410 GW, of which about 87% are data centres. Another frequently cited figure: for a generation project completed in 2023, the median time from application to actual interconnection was roughly five years. (That is generation interconnection data, not strictly equivalent to data centre load interconnection, but it illustrates the length of the queue just as well.)

What makes it worse is that the utilities themselves do not believe all these requests will materialise. ERCOT simply halves the volume of new data centre requests for planning purposes (planning at roughly 49.8%) and pushes every projected energisation date back by a uniform 180 days, because historically such projects have run late by an average of about 220 days. PJM, another major grid, mandates that large loads ramp over at least 36 months.

Why can money not solve it? Because the queue is blocked by two things money cannot move: physics (transformers, lines and the like have to be waited for, and land and rights of way have to be acquired) and regulation (study processes and approval schedules). No amount of money compresses a utility’s five-year study into three months, and none gets a transmission line crossing several counties permitted overnight.

So the truly scarce asset on this chain has never been GPUs. It is “a parcel of land that can genuinely be energised before 2027.” That also explains why Abilene chose to build its own power plant next door: waiting for the municipal grid was not an option.

Put it this way: your restaurant is packed and you are not short of chefs (generation) — you are short of the permit to connect the gas. The permit queue runs five years, and no amount of money buys you a place in line. You either wait, or you put a tank in the back yard (generate your own).

Bottleneck 2: Large Power Transformers — a Hard Shortage Money Cannot Move

Once you are in the power queue you still need a full equipment set to step high-voltage power down stage by stage and deliver it to the rack. The slowest-delivering and most constraining item is the large power transformer — the iron behemoth that takes hundreds of thousands of volts off the grid down to a voltage the campus can use. Lead times now run two to three years, and four hard constraints that money cannot move stack on top of one another:

First, transformer cores require a specialised grain-oriented electrical steel that only a handful of producers worldwide can make, and that steel is itself tight. Second, winding transformer coils is a craft: it takes several years to train a skilled winder, and because grid investment has been essentially flat for the past two decades, the trained workforce has long since shrunk. With demand suddenly doubling, people cannot be replaced in a year or two. Third, finished units must be dielectrically verified on dedicated high-voltage test benches, and those test benches are scarce in their own right. Fourth, and most important: after a long stretch of slow grid load growth, the entire supply chain squeezed out its spare capacity — and now that AI has lifted demand overnight, the industry has almost no idle capacity left to absorb it.

How slow, concretely? Large power transformer lead times have stretched beyond 36 months, and longer still for the largest ratings. Several North American leaders (Siemens Energy, Hitachi Energy and others) are each expanding capacity, with industry estimates putting combined investment at roughly $2bn; that capacity comes online around 2028 and, when it arrives, what it delivers is “lead times stop lengthening,” not “spot availability is suddenly ample.” Extrapolating from the current pace, this shortage most likely stays hard past 2028 — a base-case judgement, not a certainty.

What would break it? Watch one signal: whether lead times peak and stabilise — not whether spot supply looks better. If lead times are still lengthening in 2027, capacity has not kept up at all.

Think of it as commissioning a hand-forged specialty part: the only furnace that smelts that steel is booked out two years, and the one master craftsman who can forge the part is close to retirement with no successor. At that point money is useless — it will not shorten the furnace queue and it will not conjure up a craftsman.

Representative companies: the high-voltage equipment set is made by Hitachi Energy, Siemens Energy, GE Vernova (GEV), Eaton (ETN) and ABB — the same small group runs from the highest-voltage transmission gear all the way down to the switchgear inside the campus. Almost every high-voltage step is this same cohort, new entrants find it very hard to break in, and that is precisely where their pricing power comes from.

Bottleneck 3: Generation Itself, and Four Escape Routes to Self-Supply — on Wildly Different Clocks

With interconnection queues running five years, many campuses simply generate their own power (the industry term is “behind-the-meter” supply). But there are four routes to self-supply, and the market routinely lumps them together when in fact their credibility and their usable timing are worlds apart:

  • Gas turbines: the most realistic large-scale near-term supplement. But market leader GE Vernova is sold out through 2028, with under 10 GW of capacity that can be freed up by 2029 — and burning your own gas brings new complications: you need a gas pipeline connection, you need emissions and environmental permits, and you add single-plant failure risk that can take the whole site down.
  • Restarting retired nuclear plants: genuinely real (Microsoft signed a twenty-year agreement with Constellation to restart a unit at Three Mile Island). But the business has a hard ceiling: only so many old units in the United States can be restarted at all, and once they are done, they are done — you cannot scale it up at will the way you can build a factory. So it commands a scarcity premium, but it is not replicable.
  • Solid-oxide fuel cells (the kind Bloom Energy makes): one of the few scalable options among the four that can be installed and generating power now. (Reciprocating gas gensets and small gas turbines can also be deployed relatively quickly at suitable sites.) But in a world where grid interconnection takes five years, the simple fact of “power available today” is itself scarce — a point the market routinely underrates.
  • Small modular reactors (SMRs): the sexiest story and the press’s favourite. But it is mostly a post-2030 proposition, with next to no near-term contribution to the power shortfall of the next year or two.

Here lies the single biggest misjudgement on offer: treating an option still on the drawing board, like SMRs, as a cure for today’s power shortfall — and paying a price that assumes immediate delivery.

Say the town’s gas hook-up has a five-year wait. One person buys an off-the-shelf generator and runs it the same day (fuel cells). Another restarts the old boiler in the yard (nuclear restart — but not every household has an old boiler). A third orders a micro reactor still on the drawing board (SMR, arriving in three years). Buying the blueprint as though it were available today is the most expensive of those mistakes.

Bottleneck 4: Advanced Packaging (CoWoS) — a Capacity Shortage That Will Ease

Now cross from power to the silicon side. A high-end AI chip is not a single slab; it is a compute die and several high-bandwidth memory stacks assembled and interconnected at extreme precision, rather like Lego. That stack-and-connect step is advanced packaging, and the top tier used by the highest-end AI chips is known in the industry as CoWoS — with capacity highly concentrated at TSMC.

Why does it bind? Because assembling multiple dies together at high yield is hard: hard on yield, hard on the substrate underneath, hard on customer qualification. TSMC devotes 10% to 20% of its capex specifically to packaging, and supply-chain estimates put NVIDIA alone at over 60% of the booked capacity (an industry estimate, not TSMC disclosure).

But there is one critical difference from transformers: TSMC is actively expanding capacity at scale. Industry estimates have CoWoS capacity climbing from roughly 35,000 wafers per month in 2024 toward 90,000–130,000 per month by end-2026 (note that this is a range, not a settled figure). So a reasonable judgement is that mainstream capacity eases materially in 2H26, while the very highest-end, largest-format packaging tier — which yields fewer finished units per wafer and carries a qualification cycle — may stay tight into 2027.

CoWoS is therefore not “permanently short” but “easing, just unevenly.” This matters enormously: if you pay a permanent-moat price for a stock riding the CoWoS windfall, you are buying a self-resolving shortage as though it were a structural monopoly. That is the easiest trap to fall into with this class of bottleneck.

Bottleneck 5: HBM High-Bandwidth Memory — Stickier Than CoWoS

Sitting right alongside packaging is high-bandwidth memory (HBM) — as described earlier, the memory stacked directly against the compute die with extremely fast read/write, and the lifeblood of AI inference. It belongs to the same “capacity can expand, but slowly” class as CoWoS, yet it is stickier, for three reasons.

First, to store an equivalent bit, HBM consumes roughly three times the silicon of ordinary memory (DDR5) — it is inherently more capacity-hungry. Second, it is built by stacking many memory dies and drilling through-connections between them, and stacking yield is very difficult. Third, and hardest of all: for NVIDIA to use a given supplier’s HBM, the part must clear an extraordinarily long and demanding qualification (verified item by item, by product and by platform, before anyone dares go to volume). Those three in combination leave just three suppliers worldwide able to ship reliably — SK hynix, Samsung and Micron (MU) — with SK hynix alone at roughly 60% of shipment volume (2Q25 data).

How long can it bind? Bit supply is indeed growing quickly, but the three factors above (3x the silicon, stacking yield, punishing qualification) keep usable high-end HBM tight beyond 2026 — Micron has already effectively locked up its full-year 2026 HBM capacity under price-and-volume agreements. So it loosens more slowly and stickily than CoWoS, but it is equally not a permanent monopoly: the moment a usable fourth supplier appears, or a new generation reduces silicon consumed per bit, that wall starts to give.

Bottleneck 6: One Film on the Packaging Substrate — an MSG Company Constrains the Whole Industry

This is the most overlooked and yet hardest single point on the entire chain. Once a chip is packaged, it must be mounted on something called a packaging substrate (FCBGA — the board that carries the die and connects it to the outside world), and making that substrate requires a build-up film called ABF. The overwhelming majority of that film worldwide is supplied by a single Japanese company, Ajinomoto (which reports share above 90%, making it the de facto industry standard). Yes — the MSG company.

Why only them? Because this is a proprietary formulation plus decades of accumulated process know-how; you cannot simply spend money and reproduce thirty years of Ajinomoto’s learning. Substrate capacity itself (made by Unimicron, Ibiden, AT&S and a few others) can still be expanded gradually — but as long as this film stays concentrated in one pair of hands, the entire high-end packaging chain carries a single point that is extremely hard to substitute.

Think of it this way: every Michelin-starred chef in the world (NVIDIA, TSMC) is fighting over kitchen space, but the one specialty sauce every one of them uses is made by a single small workshop. Build all the kitchens you like — if the sauce workshop does not nod, the dishes still do not come out complete.

Bottleneck 7: The “Japan Wall” at the Very Top — the Deepest Moat, and the Least Discussed

ABF film is not an isolated case. The further upstream you travel, the more you run into an invisible wall of near-monopolies held almost entirely by Japanese (and a few Korean) companies. It is among the deepest-moated segments on the entire chain:

  • The most advanced lithography (EUV, extreme ultraviolet lithography — the equipment required to make the most advanced chips): only one company in the world, ASML of the Netherlands, can build it. The wall is twenty years of accumulated technology, and a new challenger has to close a twenty-year gap before it can even enter.
  • Silicon wafers (the round base plate chips are built on): the high-end market is highly concentrated in two Japanese companies, Shin-Etsu Chemical and SUMCO.
  • Photoresist and mask blanks (the photosensitive materials and master plates used in lithography): again a short list of Japanese firms — Tokyo Ohka, Shin-Etsu, AGC and Hoya.

These are among the hardest moats on the chain for capital to breach. Unlike NVIDIA — whose CUDA ecosystem will be gradually eroded by major customers’ in-house silicon — these upstream links leave downstream customers with essentially no second supplier to switch to.

But here an honest caveat, and one most people miss: the deepest moat is not the same as the best stock. These upstream materials companies run a volume-times-price business; they are fundamentally cyclical-cum-defensive names that ride the semiconductor cycle up and down, with far less operating leverage than a platform like NVIDIA. Their defensive qualities are formidable, but you cannot buy them on an AI-growth framework — you need a cyclical-and-defensive one. The highest wall does not mean the fastest climb.

Bottleneck 8: Optical Modules — the Class Most Likely to Glut, Where Volume Does Not Mean Profit

Turn to the networking side and optical modules (when an electrical signal cannot travel far enough, you send it as light; an optical module is the device that converts between the two). It is an instructive counter-example: volume explodes, gross margin stays thinnest.

Why? Because the closer you move toward the module assembly end, the thinner the margin gets. Coherent (COHR) and Lumentum (LITE), the companies doing this work, run company-wide gross margins in the region of 30%–40% — already well below NVIDIA’s 70% or TSMC’s 60% — while the furthest-downstream server assembly step is thinner still, in the single digits to about 10%. The point is not any one precise number but the pattern: the closer a link sits to assembly, the thinner the profit, and exploding volume does not mean exploding money. (Shipments of high-speed optical modules at 800G and above run at roughly 2.6x 2025 levels in 2026 — but large volume is not thick profit.)

What is genuinely scarce is not the assembled module but the laser chip upstream of it (the EML/CW laser sources grown on indium phosphide, InP, substrates). And that upstream shortage is easing: industry research house LightCounting reports that InP laser capacity is catching up through 2026 and may even tip into oversupply.

So the optical module chain is entirely unlike HBM above: it is closer to a commodity-cyclical shortage, where capital arrives fast and may well overshoot. That sets a trap. When optical modules are earning spectacular money on shortage and the shares have been bid up hard, the market extrapolates today’s tightness indefinitely — and once upstream capacity lands and prices roll over, profits and multiples fall together. The signal to watch is simple: new InP capacity coming online plus spot prices for high-speed modules beginning to slide is the first symptom of oversupply.

Bottleneck 9: The “Last Segment” of Cooling — the Hard Part Is Not Metal, It Is a Qualified Loop

The final bottleneck is cooling. Everyone is talking about liquid cooling, but what actually binds inside liquid cooling is not the broad direction of whether to adopt it — it is the system that delivers coolant precisely and reliably to every single chip and takes it back again: coolant distribution units (CDUs), the various pipework, and a small part called a quick-disconnect coupling (a fitting that seals on insertion and does not leak). A high-density rack contains dozens of these couplings or more, and a single leaking connection can take the whole rack offline or even destroy several million dollars of silicon inside it.

The difficulty here is counter-intuitive: the hard part is not fabricating the metal parts, it is getting the whole loop through demanding qualification (uniform flow, material compatibility, zero leakage, serviceability). For example, one Eaton coolant distribution unit is rated at 2.3 MW on an 8°C approach temperature but only 1.15 MW on a 4°C approach — once the nameplate figure leaves the operating conditions it was validated under, it means nothing. What binds at this link is therefore qualified capacity, not metal capacity.

The liquid cooling market as a whole grows from roughly $3bn in 2025 toward about $7bn by 2029, but that growth relieves “can it be built,” not “can it be qualified.” The system builders include Vertiv (VRT) and Eaton (ETN), with Amphenol (APH), Parker (PH) and nVent (NVT) among those making the quick-disconnects. This link currently sits at an early stage — reference designs have only just appeared and approved-vendor lists are still lengthening — and whoever secures this new position before industry standards harden gets a window of qualification premium.

Nine Bottlenecks in One Sentence: Separate “Will Ease” from “Cannot Be Replaced”

Having dug through all nine, you can feel the sentence we most want to leave you with:

The media reports shortages. We report when shortages end.
Core judgement: separating the shortages that will ease (CoWoS, optical modules) from the shortages that cannot be replaced (ABF film, the Japanese materials wall, grid interconnection) is the most important conclusion in this chapter.

Because it helps you avoid the most expensive trap in AI investing: paying a “shortage forever” price for a link where the shortage is about to end. Sort the nine bottlenecks above by shelf life and three classes emerge.

Class one: cannot be replaced (structural / IP-protected), the longest shelf life. EUV lithography (only ASML can build it), ABF film (Ajinomoto above 90% share), silicon wafers (highly concentrated in Shin-Etsu and SUMCO). New entrants find it extremely hard to break in, these shortages persist for a considerable time, and they deserve moat valuations — but remember that the upstream materials names among them are fundamentally cyclical-cum-defensive assets.

Class two: will ease, but unevenly (capacity-constrained), and the easiest to misread. Large transformers, CoWoS advanced packaging and HBM all sit here. Capacity can expand, but it has to clear qualification, ramp yield and find skilled labour, so it expands slowly and unevenly. The key is not to treat these as permanent monopolies: they will loosen, just in a particular order and at different speeds (mainstream CoWoS eases first in 2H26 with the high end running to 2027; transformers not until after 2028; HBM stickier still).

Class three: will glut (commodity-cyclical), the shortest shelf life and the deepest trap. Optical modules and some general-purpose components belong here. Demand spikes, prices rise, capital floods in, and a year or two later supply catches up and the shortage disappears. You think you are buying long-term growth; in fact you are buying a windfall that will be destroyed by the very capacity it attracted — and buying it at its most expensive moment.

Finally, remember: bottlenecks move. Today the hardest narrow point is power and electrical equipment. But suppose transformer capacity lands in 2028 and the power problem eases — the hardest narrow point then migrates to whatever link is next-slowest, which might be some critical material, or it might be skilled construction labour. Reading a supply chain is not only about who is short now; it is about when today’s shortage stops being short, and who is short next when it does.

Nine Chokepoints: Speed of Relief and Shelf Life

Bar length = estimated shelf life; colour = shortage type; ordered from fastest to ease to hardest to eliminate

Capacity-constrained — solvable with investment Structural — no quick fix Qualification / oligopoly — barrier-type
1 yr3 yrs5 yrs7 yrs10 yrs+
Optical modules
Highest glut risk
1–2 yrs Capacity
Advanced packaging (CoWoS)
TSMC expanding fast
1–2 yrs Capacity
Cooling’s last segment
CDU qualification barrier
2–3 yrs Qualification
HBM high-bandwidth memory
Three-supplier qualification wall
2–3 yrs Oligopoly + qual.
Large power transformers
3 yr+ lead times, capacity being built
3–5 yrs Capacity
ABF substrate film
Ajinomoto single-point monopoly
3–5 yrs+ Single point
Grid interconnection queue
Multi-year permitting backlog
5–10 yrs Structural
Generation itself
Gas fast / nuclear very slow
Gas
Wind/solar
Nuclear 15 yrs+
2→15 yrs, an enormous spread
The Japanese materials wall
Decades of IP and process know-how
10 yrs+ (the deepest moat) Structural
✦ Acute but self-correcting (1–2 yrs)
Optical modules, CoWoS — solvable with capital; relief begins 2H26
✦ Acute and enduring (5 yrs+)
Grid interconnection, the Japanese materials wall, ABF film — physical and IP constraints that cannot be replicated quickly
✦ Medium-speed relief (2–3 yrs)
Cooling CDU qualification, the HBM oligopoly wall — qualification cycles or concentration are the binding constraint
✦ Widest dispersion (2→15 yrs)
Generation itself: gas is fast (2 yrs), nuclear extremely slow (15 yrs+) — the strategy chosen sets the clock

Source: author’s analysis and synthesis; shelf-life figures are the author’s estimates, not official forecasts

This chapter has worked all nine bottlenecks to the bottom, but for exactly which companies stand behind each bottleneck layer, the appendix at the end of the report lists them in full for the relevant layers — you can work down the list name by name.

7. Is the Demand Real? The Chain’s Deepest Question Mark

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Every piece of analysis above rests on one assumption: that the money underneath — hundreds of billions of dollars a year, trillions in aggregate — is real and sustainable. Is it?

Let us be precise about this: the honest bear case is not “demand is fake and the bubble is about to burst.” There is no public evidence today of widespread idle compute or collapsing usage; real AI consumption is still growing. Between end-2022 and end-2024, the cost of running one million inference tokens fell from roughly $20 to about $0.07 — a decline of some 280x — and cheapness has pulled in a large volume of genuine demand. What deserves real concern is two other things, both subtler and much harder to refute.

First, circular financing. Break those hundreds of billions apart and one portion is carried by hyperscalers funding capex out of real cloud revenue — hard foundations. But another portion is carried by a financing structure whose parties bite down on one another. The cleanest example is the neocloud CoreWeave: it pledges the GPUs it owns as collateral to borrow, then spends the proceeds on more GPUs. In a single quarter its capex (roughly $6.8bn) ran at more than three times revenue (roughly $2.1bn), with sizeable depreciation and interest on the books — while NVIDIA is simultaneously its supplier, its shareholder, and its ecosystem partner. The implication: the supplier’s profit, the borrower’s collateral, and the customer’s order book strengthen together, and can weaken together. This is not an allegation that anyone is cooking the books; it is an observation that the risks inside this system are highly correlated. Picture a village where the seed merchant lends farmers the money to buy his seed, takes an equity stake in their land, and signs an offtake contract for the harvest. In good years all three parties make money; in a bad harvest all three blow up at once, because they were never really three things.

Second, depreciation mismatch — the deeper layer. Those AI chips, hundreds of thousands of dollars apiece, are depreciated on the books over five to six years (Microsoft, Meta and Google have all extended server useful lives in recent years, which mechanically suppresses current-period depreciation and lifts reported profit; the filings do not state a motive). The problem is that a frontier training chip’s genuine high-value life may be only two or three years. When the next generation arrives with materially better compute per watt and per dollar, the premium on the old silicon is competed away. Amortised over six years on the books, obsolete in three in practice — that gap is the deepest short thesis on the whole chain.

How do the bulls answer? The bull case requires believing in something called the “value cascade.” Older chips may no longer suit frontier training, but they can be stepped down the stack — retired into inference, fine-tuning and low-priced workloads — and keep generating cash across the full accounting life. Put it this way: you depreciate over six years a machine that is really obsolete in three, and the first three years of reported profit look excellent. From year four, either that old machine genuinely redeploys onto lighter work and keeps earning (bulls are right), or it is scrap metal still being amortised on the balance sheet (bears are right).

So the conclusion of this chapter is not “run for the exit” — it is to hand you the right question to watch. The question is not whether demand disappears (near term, it will not), but whether this extraordinary volume of investment can ultimately earn an adequate return. That in turn depends on whether the value cascade holds, how fast token prices fall, and whether that correlated financing complex comes under pressure all at once at some point. All of it can be tested quarter by quarter — and it is the single thing on this chain most worth tracking over the long run.

8. Who Is Really Doing AI and Who Is Just Riding the Word: An Evidence Ladder

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By now you can read how the money flows, who sits on the critical chokepoints, how long the shortages can last, and what the deepest question mark over demand really is. But open the news in the real world and every screen is full of companies “fully embracing AI.” How do you tell which ones are real and which have simply printed the letters “AI” on the cover of their annual report?

One ladder: companies genuinely doing AI have products already running, contracts already signed and revenue already booked. Companies riding the word have simply said “AI” a few more times on the roadshow.

We will not hand you a single-veto checklist — that would unfairly condemn asset-light software companies and wrongly kill off firms barred by NDA from naming customers. Instead, here is an evidence ladder with six rungs: the higher you climb, the harder the evidence. Simply listing six questions would say nothing, so each rung comes with a concrete way to spot it at a glance and a real-world contrast. First, one governing principle: “not disclosed” and “no evidence” are two different things. A company that does not break out AI revenue is not thereby a pretender — it simply has not climbed to that rung yet.

Rung one, and the hardest: it discloses AI revenue separately, and that line is both large and growing fast. How to check: open the latest quarterly report and look for a standalone line reading “data centre revenue” or “AI revenue,” with a year-on-year growth rate attached. NVIDIA tells you every quarter exactly what data centre revenue was and how much it grew; Broadcom breaks out “AI semiconductor revenue” on its own. A company willing to carve out AI revenue and put a growth rate next to it is, as a rule, not faking. The converse: a company where you can comb the whole filing without finding a single AI revenue figure, but which repeats “we are seeing strong AI demand” on the call, has not reached rung one.

Rung two: it does not break out AI revenue, but it has signed large orders or quantifiable real-world volumes. How to check: look for verifiable hard numbers — backlog, signed contracts, actual shipments or usage. A power-equipment company saying “data centre orders up 240% year on year, record backlog,” or an optical module maker saying “800G module shipments doubled,” is worth far more than “demand is good.” Watch for the most common sleight of hand: talking only about a “healthy sales pipeline” or “enthusiastic inbound enquiries.” A pipeline is not an order and an enquiry is not revenue; dressing up “might buy” as “has bought” is the favourite rhetorical device of the AI-adjacent.

Rung three: the AI business has its own gross margin and unit economics, proving it actually makes money rather than buying revenue. How to check: adjacency is not enough — ask whether this line is profitable. A superb negative example is the server assembly step discussed earlier. Its AI revenue purity is extremely high (almost every order is an AI order), yet that process step earns only single-digit gross margin: Super Micro (SMCI) reported company-wide gross margin of just 9.9% in its most recent fiscal quarter, with revenue through the roof and profit not following. Conversely, a company that can articulate “here is my AI gross margin, here is what I earn per unit” has demonstrated that it stands on the profit side of the ledger, not merely the revenue side.

Rung four: where its business genuinely requires it, it has committed real capital to capacity or R&D. How to check: this rung must be applied to the right category. Asset-heavy companies (foundries, equipment, power, operators) should be expanding capacity and running large capex; talk without spend is empty. But an asset-light software company should not be posting heavy capacity spend, and docking it points for “not spending on expansion” does it an injustice. The question is therefore: for the category that ought to spend, did it actually spend — and for the category that ought not to, do not force the test.

Rung five: third-party corroboration from customers or suppliers. How to check: another company’s filings and another company’s earnings call naming it is always more credible than its own promotion. A custom-silicon design house claiming a large order from a major customer need not be taken entirely at face value; but if that customer — say a hyperscaler — names the partnership in its own results, credibility jumps a level immediately. Cross-verification always beats self-report.

Rung six, the softest — yet the easiest place to catch a fake: has management told a consistent story across multiple quarters? How to check: pull the last four or five earnings calls and read them side by side. Companies genuinely doing AI get more specific over time, with finer-grained numbers each quarter. Companies riding the word tend to change the framing every quarter, grow vaguer as they go, and quietly stop mentioning the metric they touted last quarter. A drifting narrative is the most basic — and most reliable — danger signal there is.

How to use the ladder, in one line: it is not there to help you find winners, it is there to help you clear mines. AI is the biggest narrative of the era, and the bigger the narrative, the more people want a free ride. The more a company puts “AI” in every sentence while failing to climb even one rung (no revenue figure, no orders, no gross margin, no third-party corroboration, and a story that keeps shifting), the more wary you should be. Conversely, the companies genuinely sitting on the main artery of the cash flow often feel no need to keep stressing their AI exposure — the numbers in their filings speak for them. Apply these six rungs to any “AI concept stock” and exactly which rung it stands on becomes obvious at a glance.

The Six-Rung Evidence Ladder: Real AI vs. Riding the Word

The lower the rung, the harder it is to fake → start verifying at rung one and work upward as corroboration

Rung 6 🔓
Consistent management narrative (softest)
A story that holds across quarters and grows more specific — but the easiest signal to stage-manage, and the riskiest to rely on alone.
Soft
Rung 5 🔓
Customer or supplier corroboration
Being named in someone else’s filings beats self-promotion — but it remains indirect evidence and needs the lower rungs to confirm it.
Rung 4 🔒
Real capital committed to capacity or R&D
Asset-heavy firms that should be expanding actually are; do not force this test on asset-light firms. Capital action beats verbal commitment.
Rung 3 🔒
Standalone gross margin / unit economics for the AI business
Able to break out its own gross margin or unit economics, proving real profit rather than loss-making volume or scale for its own sake.
Rung 2 🔒
Quantifiable large orders / actual shipment volumes
Backlog, contracts, shipment figures — committed volume in black and white, and materially more costly to fabricate.
Rung 1 🔒
AI revenue disclosed separately + growth rate (hardest)
As with NVDA and AVGO breaking out data centre / AI revenue each quarter — mandatory disclosure, hardest to fake, and the place to start your check.
Hard
▲ Bottom: hardest to fake
Not there to find winners — there to clear mines
Top: easiest to stage ▼

9. Winners, Losers and Three Scenarios

▼
Editorial illustration: a three-way railway junction branching into three tracks toward different horizons, standing for the three scenarios facing the AI supply chain

On any supply chain, for every party eating well there is a party taking the hit. Start with the casualty list: under what conditions does each one fall first?

  • If power stays unavailable: the operators that have already bought their chips but cannot switch them on for lack of power and cooling suffer first. Chips worth hundreds of thousands of dollars each, stacked in an unfinished shell, depreciating every day and earning nothing.
  • If capex slows: once the hyperscalers tap the brakes, the first to feel the chill are the links that live off new-build projects — construction, electrical, cooling, assembly. Their revenue is project-based; when projects stop, revenue stops immediately.
  • If campuses get “stranded”: contracts signed in volume, but any one of money, power or silicon failing to arrive — heavy capital committed with returns pushed out indefinitely. The asset managers financing it and the highly leveraged operators come under pressure (which connects straight back to the circular-financing risk in Chapter 7).
  • If inventory builds: if demand disappoints, the highly cyclical links — memory, certain components — are the most exposed to a pile-up: undersupplied in the boom, and hit with collapsing prices when it turns.

Understand the casualty logic and you can reason through three futures. Note carefully: these are not predictions. They are three maps, so that whichever case materialises you know where the money moves.

Scenario one: compute keeps accelerating. Demand keeps exploding, everyone builds flat out, and the physical bottlenecks call the shots: power, electrical gear, advanced packaging, cooling, optical modules — whoever is tightest earns the most. The risk is that valuations get pushed too far, so that even a modest slowdown in pace produces a violent de-rating.

Scenario two: capex enters a digestion phase. The building is largely done and the hyperscalers pivot to filling and running the capacity they already have. Money shifts from “building the factory” to “using the factory”: software, operations and efficiency optimisation come to the fore, while hardware companies dependent purely on new-build orders see order books weaken. The winners shift from those selling bricks to those managing the building.

Scenario three: inference gets cheaper. Here lies the fork most easily reasoned backwards, so think it through carefully: cheaper does not mean less demand. Once prices fall, two opposite outcomes are possible. Either the savings outrun the incremental usage, the profit pool for compute hardware is compressed, and value migrates toward the application layer — or cheapness detonates demand, everyone uses AI far more aggressively, and aggregate compute demand keeps climbing. Historically, many technologies have taken the second path: when something gets cheap, consumption explodes. Which one it is here is the single biggest open question in this entire story. Whatever you do, do not reflexively conclude from “inference is getting cheaper” that “infrastructure demand must shrink.”

The three maps differ, but one statement holds across all three scenarios — and it is the judgement we most want you to take away:

How “important” a company is to AI and whether it is “worth buying” are two different questions. Some companies operate quietly yet sit on the narrowest opening in the whole chain and are enormously important to the industry — but buy in at its most expensive point and, however secure that chokepoint, the investment can still lose money. Conversely, some companies tell a thunderous story at a rich valuation while occupying no critical position at all. Your job is not to guess which scenario comes true; it is to ask two separate questions: does this company actually sit on a chokepoint? And at today’s price, has that advantage already been fully discounted in advance?

Chapter 9 · Scenario Analysis

Three Scenarios: Where the Money Flows in Each

① 🚀 Compute keeps accelerating

Demand keeps exploding; the physical bottlenecks call the shots

  • Winners: power / electrical equipment (transformers, GEV, ETN, SU.PA)
  • Winners: advanced packaging (TSM CoWoS), cooling (VRT CDUs), optical modules
  • Risk: valuations pushed too far; any easing of pace brings a violent de-rating
Takeaway Chokepoints rule — and cost the most
② 🏗️→💻 Capex digestion phase

Building largely done; hyperscalers pivot to filling the capacity already built

  • Winners: software / operations / efficiency optimisation (NOW, DDOG, NET and peers)
  • Losers: hardware companies dependent purely on new-build orders
  • Money shifts from “building the factory” to “using the factory”
Takeaway From selling bricks to managing the building
③ ⚡ Inference gets cheaper

The critical fork: cheaper ≠ less demand

  • Outcome A: compute demand explodes instead (cheaper → more usage; the historical pattern)
  • Outcome B: value migrates to the application layer, compressing infrastructure profits
  • The two outcomes point in opposite directions — the largest open question of all
Takeaway Jevons paradox — the biggest unknown
🔑

Whichever scenario plays out, ask two questions (1) Does this company actually sit on a chokepoint? (2) At today’s price, has that advantage already been discounted in advance?

10. Important ≠ Worth Buying: A “Chokepoint vs. Value” Scorecard

▼

Finally, one table to put the whole report to work. The dozen-odd companies below are not a recommended list — quite the opposite. The table exists to teach you not to read inclusion as endorsement. We have deliberately picked several mutually contradictory types so you can see that “hard chokepoint,” “AI purity” and “worth buying” are frequently not the same thing.

Four dimensions: the relevant chokepoint (which link it sits on), AI revenue purity (how much of its revenue is genuinely tied to AI), positional strength (whether it holds real pricing power at that link), and current evidence / principal counter-evidence.

CompanyRelevant chokepointAI purityPositional strengthCurrent evidence / principal counter-evidence
NVIDIA NVDA Compute silicon + the CUDA ecosystem High Strong Evidence: exceptional gross margin, deep ecosystem lock-in. Counter: still carries other businesses such as gaming; major customers’ in-house silicon is closing in
TSMC TSM Wafer foundry + advanced packaging Medium Strong Evidence: the highest-end AI chips cannot route around it. Counter: pure foundry — if downstream cools, it takes the cycle too
ASML ASML EUV lithography Medium Strong Evidence: sole supplier worldwide, the deepest moat on the chain. Counter: its customers are every chipmaker, and orders are lumpy
Micron MU HBM high-bandwidth memory Medium Medium Evidence: the HBM qualification wall holds rivals out. Counter: memory is a notoriously cyclical business — when it turns, prices collapse
Broadcom AVGO Custom silicon for major customers + networking Medium Strong Evidence: builds long-cycle custom chips for large customers, producing durable revenue (though not a contractually locked annuity). Counter: dependent on a handful of hyperscale customers, so concentration risk is high
GE Vernova GEV Gas turbines + grid equipment Low Strong Evidence: sits on the slowest clock of all, power, with a full order book. Counter: AI is only part of its power demand — an indirect beneficiary
Eaton ETN Switchgear + substation equipment Low Medium Evidence: the gateway through which power reaches the rack, with long lead times. Counter: the business spans industrials and autos, so AI is a limited share
Vertiv VRT Data hall power + cooling Medium Medium Evidence: purpose-built for data centres, serving both power and thermal, with a second revenue bite from aftermarket. Counter: the valuation already embeds very high growth
Super Micro SMCI AI server assembly High Weak Evidence: high AI purity, moving in lockstep with NVIDIA. Counter: assembly gross margin is thin to single digits — the textbook case of big revenue, thin profit
Ajinomoto Ajinomoto ABF film for packaging substrates Low Strong Evidence: the critical film layer in high-end packaging substrates; the company reports over 90% share, an extremely hard single point to replace. Counter: fundamentally a cyclical-cum-defensive asset, not an AI growth story
Coherent COHR Optical modules Medium Medium Evidence: the larger the cluster, the more of them get used. Counter: commodity-cyclical with many competitors — the link most prone to overcapacity
Astera Labs ALAB High-speed chip-to-chip interconnect (PCIe/CXL) High Medium Evidence: high AI purity and high gross margin, sitting on a new narrow point in intra-rack interconnect. Counter: could be absorbed into larger silicon, and expectations are already elevated
Palantir PLTR AI operations and data software Medium Medium Evidence: recurring subscriptions and high software gross margin. Counter: not a physical chokepoint where the campus stops without it, and valuation expectations are extremely high
CoreWeave CRWV Neocloud AI capacity High Weak Evidence: extremely high AI purity. Counter: asset-heavy, highly levered, circular financing, and reliant on a handful of large customers

Read that table across once and you have the essence of the whole report:

  • High chokepoint, low AI purity: GEV and ETN — enormously important, but AI is only part of the business.
  • High AI purity, weak bargaining power: SMCI and CRWV — breathing in time with AI, yet unable to earn the profit a chokepoint should command.
  • Strong moat, expensive expectations: NVDA and ASML — the chokepoint is real, but the price already carries very high hopes.
  • Deepest moat, yet cyclical-cum-defensive: Ajinomoto and Shin-Etsu — the highest walls on the chain, but not high growth, and they need a different framework.
  • Temporary scarcity, supply at risk: memory and optical modules — short today, potentially not short tomorrow.

Understand those five contrasts and you have the eyes for it: important and worth buying are two different things.

Important ≠ Worth Buying: An Illustrative Positioning Map
Important & expensive
(priced in)
Important & good value
(selected opportunities)
Secondary & expensive
(avoid)
Secondary, worth watching
(overlooked value)
← Valuation attractiveness →
← Supply-chain importance →
NVDA ASML 000660.KS VRT ETN SNPS/CDNS 4063.T MOD NVT SMCI Large EPC
Illustrative analytical framework only — not investment advice

One last opening to leave you with: the dozen-odd names above are a demonstration sample, nowhere near the full list. Across the whole chain — from rare gases and photoresist at the very top to on-site operations at the very bottom — roughly 897 listed companies are scattered across the 18 layers, alongside a cohort of still-private companies that could IPO at any time (CoolIT in liquid cooling, Ayar Labs and Lightmatter in optical interconnect) sitting on narrow points of their own. The complete supply-chain map, which you can open layer by layer, is in the accompanying appendix: it lays out all 18 layers, 292 components and roughly 900 companies in front of you, to be worked through layer by layer and name by name. Once you have absorbed the logic of this report, go wander that map — and for every company on it you will immediately be able to ask the same set of questions. Which layer does it sit on? How tight is its grip? When does this shortage expire? Is it really doing AI, or just riding the word? And at this price, has the advantage already been fully discounted?

Sources and Methodology

▼

This report aims to attribute a source and a date to every citable figure. Below are the several dozen most important data points in the report, listed by chapter; a companion data workbook maintains the complete line-by-line sourcing and confidence levels. A few notes on methodology. We distinguish throughout between “hard data” (company filings, regulators, national laboratories, official documents) and “analytical judgement” (inferences drawn from that evidence). Where something is a judgement rather than a fact, the text flags it as such with language like “we estimate” or “base case.”

Power and the Grid

  • ERCOT large-load interconnection requests of roughly 410 GW, ~87% of it data centres: ERCOT Large Load Update, 2026-04-01.
  • ERCOT planning at roughly 49.8%, a uniform 180-day delay assumption, historical average slippage of about 220 days: ERCOT long-term load forecast methodology update, 2025-04-07.
  • Median “application to interconnection” time for generation projects of roughly five years: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) interconnection queue study, 2025.
  • PJM large loads ramping over at least 36 months: PJM 2026 Long-Term Load Forecast, 2026-01-23.
  • Large power transformer lead times of 36 months and beyond: U.S. Department of Energy, Large Power Transformer Resilience Report, July 2024.
  • Heavy-duty gas turbine capacity sold out through 2028, with under 10 GW able to be freed up in 2029: GE Vernova investor webcast, 2025-12-09.
  • Microsoft’s twenty-year agreement with Constellation (Three Mile Island unit restart): Constellation 2025 Sustainability Report.
  • Bloom’s partnership with Oracle, 55-day delivery, roadmap to 2.8 GW: Bloom Energy, 2026-04-13.

Chips, Memory and Manufacturing

  • CoWoS capacity climbing from roughly 35k wafers per month in 2024 toward 90k–130k per month by end-2026 (range of industry estimates); TSMC advanced packaging at 10%–20% of capex: TrendForce, 2025-12-08; TSMC 4Q25 earnings call transcript.
  • HBM3E consuming roughly 3x the silicon of DDR5 per equivalent bit: Micron investor materials, December 2024.
  • SK hynix holding roughly 60% of HBM shipments (2Q25, Counterpoint data): SK hynix 2026 market outlook.
  • Micron’s full-year 2026 HBM capacity locked up under price-and-volume agreements: Micron, 2025-12-17.
  • Ajinomoto reporting a global share of over 90% in ABF film, the de facto industry standard: Ajinomoto FY2023 annual report.
  • ASML as the world’s only supplier of production-capable EUV lithography systems: ASML FY2024 annual report (SEC filing).
  • GB200 NVL72 fully loaded rack power of roughly 120 kW: NVIDIA official product page.

Networking, Optics and Cooling

  • 800G-and-above optical module shipments in 2026 at roughly 2.6x 2025 levels: TrendForce, 2025-12-08.
  • Liquid cooling market growing from roughly $3bn in 2025 to roughly $7bn by 2029: Dell'Oro Group, January 2026.
  • Eaton’s ROL2300 coolant distribution unit rated at 2.3 MW on an 8°C approach and 1.15 MW on a 4°C approach: Eaton product literature.

Demand, Circular Financing and Depreciation

  • Inference cost falling from roughly $20 to $0.07 per million tokens (November 2022 to October 2024, a ~280x decline): Stanford HAI, 2025 AI Index Report.
  • CoreWeave 1Q26 capex of $6.8bn, revenue of $2.08bn, D&A of $1.15bn, interest expense of $536m, and GPU-collateralised financing: CoreWeave 1Q results and $8.5bn financing announcement, March 2026.
  • Microsoft, Meta and Google extending server depreciation lives (to roughly 6 years / 5.5 years on certain assets / roughly 6 years respectively): company filings.
  • Scale of AI infrastructure investment (hundreds of billions annually, trillions cumulatively): McKinsey, 2025-04-28; roughly $38bn of upfront cost for a single 1 GW campus (illustrative model): Epoch AI, 2026-05-14.

The Evidence Ladder

  • Eaton Americas electrical data centre orders up roughly 240% year on year: Eaton 1Q results, 2026.
  • Super Micro (SMCI) company gross margin of 9.9% in the most recent fiscal quarter: Super Micro investor relations.
  • Company counts across the full chain: 18 layers, 292 components, roughly 897 listed companies after de-duplication, from this project’s proprietary supply-chain registry.

Investing involves risk; proceed with caution. This report is provided for educational and research purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer to invest, or a solicitation to buy or sell any security. Any views, analysis or estimates herein are based on public information the author believes to be reliable, but no representation is made as to their completeness, accuracy or timeliness. Investors should assess investment risk independently in light of their own circumstances and consult a qualified financial adviser where appropriate. Past market performance is not indicative of future results.

Appendix: The Complete 18-Layer Supply-Chain Map

How to Use This Appendix ▼

What follows is a layer-by-layer, line-by-line breakdown of the AI data centre supply chain across 18 layers and roughly 292 component categories. Each component carries: a plain-language explanation (using everyday analogies to make the technical concept land), representative listed companies (ordered by relevance, with tickers annotated by exchange), and a one-line statement of its economic role.

This is a reference map, not something to read cover to cover. Use the jump navigation below to go straight to the layer you care about; every layer expands and collapses independently. The genuinely scarce chokepoints are worked through in the bottleneck analysis in the main report — this appendix supplies the full, finer-grained inventory.

Layer overview: Layers 1–3 (demand and the people writing the cheques / cloud and colocation financing / development and construction) are the commercial and infrastructure starting point; Layers 4–6 (generation and the grid / distribution and conversion / cooling and water) are the true physical bottleneck band; Layers 7–9 (compute silicon / supporting and board-level components / memory and storage) are the compute core; Layers 10–12 (networking and interconnect / optics and photonics / servers and system integration) are connectivity and final assembly; Layers 13–15 (semiconductor manufacturing / equipment / materials and substrates) are the upstream supply chain; and Layers 16–18 (EDA and design / infrastructure software / cybersecurity and operations) are the software and services tier.

Jump to an Appendix Layer

Layer 1Demand and the People Writing the Cheques (Who Places the Order, Who Sets the Budget) ▼
Layer 2Cloud Operators, Colocation, REITs and Financing (Who Runs It, Who Funds It) ▼
Layer 3Data Centre Development, Construction and Commissioning (Who Turns Raw Land into a Building That Can Be Switched On) ▼
Layer 4Power, Generation & Grid ▼
Layer 5Electrical Distribution & Power Conversion ▼
Layer 6Cooling, Thermal & Water ▼
Layer 7Compute Silicon / Accelerators ▼
Layer 8Logic, Host CPUs, Analog, MCUs & Power Management ▼
Layer 8BPassive, Electromechanical & Board-Level Components ▼
Layer 9Memory & Storage ▼
Layer 10Networking & Electrical Interconnect ▼
Layer 11Optics & Photonics ▼
Layer 12Server, Rack & System Integration ▼
Layer 13Semiconductor Manufacturing (Turning Designs into Physical Chips) ▼
Layer 14Semiconductor Equipment, Metrology & Test (The Machines That Build Chips) ▼
Layer 15Semiconductor Materials, Substrates & Chemicals ▼
Layer 16EDA, Design IP & Design Services (the drawing office that sits before the fab) ▼
Layer 17AI Infrastructure Software, Scheduling, Observability & DCIM (the software brain that makes the machines run) ▼
Layer 18Cybersecurity, Resilience & Operations (the guardhouse and maintenance crew of the factory) ▼
Contents